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Abstract
Investment banks develop their own innovative derivatives to underwrite corporate issues
but they cannot preclude other banks from imitating them. However, during the process of
underwriting an innovator can learn more than its imitators about the potential clients. Moving
ﬁrst puts him ahead in the learning process. Thus, he develops an information advantage and
he can capture rents in equilibrium despite being imitated. In this context, innovation can arise
without patent protection. Consistently with this hypothesis, case studies of recent innovations
in derivatives reveal that innovators keep private some details of their deals to preserve the
asymmetry of information.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G24, L12, L89.
Keywords: Financial innovation, ﬁrst-mover advantages, asymmetric information, learning-
by-doing.
1Unlike many product innovations, innovative ﬁnancial products have been un-patentable for
many years.1Some research in Industrial Organization Theory shows that, for some industries,
patents are the only mechanism that makes it proﬁtable for ﬁrms to pay the research and devel-
opment costs (R&D henceforth) if their invented product could otherwise be reverse-engineered,
produced and marketed by competitors free-riding on the original R&D expenditure. In such types
of models, the free entry drives proﬁts to zero and potential innovators choose not to invest in R&D
without legal protection against imitation.2
Nevertheless, some models of product innovation can generate equilibria with positive innova-
tor proﬁts even when they cannot patent their discoveries.3One possibility is to assume that the
developer has a timing leadership over its imitators. If the lead period is long enough, or if R&D
costs are small enough, innovators can earn suﬃciently large monopoly rents prior to imitation so
as to oﬀset the initial R&D expenditures. In essence, this eﬀect is no diﬀerent than the eﬀect of a
patent. Another possibility is to assume that clients have costs of switching from the ﬁrst provider
of the new service (the innovator) to the late comers (the imitators). In this case the pioneer can
eﬀectively build large market shares and earn rents.
The delayed imitation hypothesis is not consistent with the most important pieces of evidence
of product innovation in ﬁnance. Tufano [30, 1989] found that periods of “monopolistic” issuing of
new ﬁnancial services are relatively short.4This makes a strong case against the argument that only
suﬃciently long periods of temporary monopoly power make innovations worthwhile. In the same
study, Tufano [30, 1989] also found that, for the 58 innovations he studied between 1974 and 1986,
the investment banks that created them could not charge monopolistic underwriting fees before
imitation occurred. Further, although data on innovation costs is not available, anecdotal evidence
suggests that these are not negligible.5,6
As Bhattacharyya and Nanda [4, 2000] point out, banks and clients may develop valuable
2relationships, making it costly for a ﬁrm to switch bankers. Thus, switching costs can explain
why early imitation may not erode an innovator’s proﬁts and therefore the incentives to innovate.
Evidence gathered in interviews of bankers by Naslund [18, 1986] suggests that switching costs
might not be signiﬁcant. Naslund noted that “the banks mentioned that if one came up with an
idea the innovator became known as the expert and customers would turn to it even if they used
another bank for other services”.7
A clue to what are the advantages to innovators in ﬁnance might be the fact that innovative
investment banks are able to capture and maintain the largest share of underwriting deals using
the product they created. This is found in Tufano’s sample of 58 securities where, despite being
imitated early, the innovators preserve the leadership in the long run. Other evidence of innovators
becoming market leaders is found by Reilly [21, 1992]: Drexel Burnham Lambert, the pioneer in
underwriting junk bonds had at least a 40% of the market between 1985 and 1988. Also, according
to Mason et. al. [15, 1995] First Boston, the innovator of asset-backed securities, underwrote
a share that almost doubled that of the second largest underwriter in this market between 1985
and 1991. More recently, Schroth [25, 2002] found that for most of the innovative equity-linked
securities between 1985 and 2001 the innovators also had the lead in the corporate underwriting
market. For other classes of derivatives the evidence is scarce. In fact, as Gastineau and Margolis
[11, 2000] argue, some derivatives markets are not easy to deﬁne and market shares are diﬃcult
to compute or disaggregate. Nevertheless, they argue that market makers are likely to have the
largest market shares, as observed in the cases mentioned.
It seems therefore that innovation in securities diﬀers qualitatively from other kinds of product
innovation. Most of the research in ﬁnancial innovation has examined extensively case studies to de-
termine why there was a demand for some new securities at the time they were introduced.8In other
words, the focus has been, basically, on explaining what made each particular innovation attrac-
3tive to investors. Not much research, though, has addressed the question of why an un-patentable
innovation is worth its R&D expenditure if imitation is early and almost costless.9The question
we try to answer here is why do investment banks ﬁnd it privately proﬁtable to be developers of
marketable ﬁnancial instruments.
The large variety of innovations observed in ﬁnance persuades us to seek a theory of innovation
that is speciﬁct oo n l ys o m ek i n do fﬁnancial products. Our model will focus on privately negotiated
ﬁnancial contracts that are designed to transfer the risk of an asset from one party to another. As we
will argue later, this type of contract includes a variety of private deals made between competitive
investment banks and the holders of claims to assets with random payoﬀs. The asset holders may
want to issue a new security whose payoﬀ is backed by the cashﬂow of the underlying asset or
may just want to swap part of the risky component of the cashﬂow. A particular characteristic of
the market where these deals are made is that the transactions, for example, a credit swap or the
purchase of a portfolio of credit card collectibles, are not observable. Conﬁdentiality agreements in
these markets are eﬀective mechanisms that allow the banker (e.g., an innovator of a derivative) to
conceal information from potential competitors.
It is clear from our motivation that the innovator must have an advantage over its imitators.
In the case of ﬁnancial innovations the lead-time is on average short and the development cost is
substantial thus the innovator must make supra-normal proﬁts during the imitation stage. After
reviewing some case studies of innovation in credit derivatives and asset securitization we can
identify a common feature: bankers choose not to disclose the history of deals they have made but
rather disclose only the aggregate dollar amount of their transactions in a given period. Presumably,
the knowledge of the history of their completed deals made is valuable and they do not wish to
make it public. Therefore, the model we present here shows how the innovator extracts private
information from early deals and uses it to compete with its imitators once they enter the market.
4As William Toy, Managing Director at CDC Capital Inc. puts it, “There is at least a perception
that the ﬁrst mover is more familiar with the product he issues than the imitator”. [29, 2001]
In the model, the advantage enjoyed by the ﬁrst-mover will be based on an information asymme-
try: innovators will have had one previous period of deal making and will acquire ﬁner information
about the distribution of cash ﬂows held by diﬀerent types of clients. When imitators enter the
market, this information advantage which is generated endogenously, will make the innovator the
“expert” banker. The expert banker will be able to oﬀer better deals to institutions than the
competition and to realize a positive proﬁt. In short, this paper is a particular an application of
Bayesian learning to corporate ﬁnance: investment banks learn about the uncertainty in the market
of corporate underwriting from past deals, so they become diﬀerentiated by the time at which they
start the learning process. Thus, moving ﬁrst puts them ahead in the learning curve.
In another testimony by a practitioner, we can ﬁnd additional evidence that bankers learn from
the deals made in the early issues of a new ﬁnancial product: “Financial Innovations such as Credit
Derivatives, are not like producing a new car, where you just sell it once manufactured. In every
deal the Innovation changes: it is perfected to better suited the client’s needs. By the ﬁfth or
sixth deal you are able to sell a much better product,” (Tom Nobile, Managing Director, Bank of
NY).[19, 2001]
To this date, we know of very few applications of Bayesian learning in corporate ﬁnance. One
exception is Sharpe’s paper [26, 1990], in which he derives a dynamic theory of “customer relation-
ships” in bank loan markets to show how the allocation of capital can be ineﬃciently shifted towards
lower quality and inexperienced ﬁrms.10Sharpe exploits the presumption that a bank which lends to
ag i v e nﬁrm can learn superior information about that borrower’s characteristics than other banks
can. This presumption, originally made by Kane and Malkiel [12, 1965] and Fama [9, 1985] for the
lending market, is consistent with the opinions we gathered in our interviews with practitioners.
5The opinions we gathered apply though to more general classes of contracts between a investment
banks and ﬁrms, which are the innovative contracts that we analyze in this paper. As this paper
shows, the dynamics of learning may allow us to better understand better the nature and the facts
of product innovation in ﬁnance.
In the next section we describe brieﬂy some case studies in the innovation of ﬁnancial products
in order to highlight the asymmetry between ﬁrms that is captured in our model. Then, we continue
by describing the game played between the investment bank that creates a new ﬁnancial product
(the innovator), the banks that imitate it and their counterparts in the deal. We characterize a
generic contract that can resemble a part of a credit derivative transaction (e.g. a credit risk swap)
or the securitization of an asset (e.g., a mortgage or a loan) and specify the proﬁts that accrue to
each of the parties in the contract. The third section presents the general set-up in which innovators
develop an information advantage over imitators by moving ﬁrst in the earliest stage of the game.
The learning process is formalized in the general case and then a simple case is used to solve for
the equilibrium in the subsequent section. There we show that it is optimal for an investment bank
to innovate in the ﬁrst stage when it chooses between developing and marketing an innovation or
not. The ﬁnal section summarizes our results.
1 Some Cases of Product Innovation in Finance
In this paper we argue that the innovator of a ﬁnancial product derives an advantage that ultimately
makes it proﬁtable to move ﬁrst rather than free-ride because he positions himself ahead of his
competitors in a learning curve. Below we discuss some well document cases in the literature in
which we can see that the innovators had private information about their products and were keen
not to disclose more information than they were legally required. This will ﬁx our ideas on the
theory presented afterwards.
61.1 The Securitization of Charge-Card Receivables
The securitization of the American Express charge-card receivables by Lehman Brothers in 1992 is a
case that matches very well the model of innovation we suggest. By February 1992, the portfolio of
outstanding charge-card collectibles was not traded as a security. Mason et. al. [15, 1995] suggest
that “... Lehman saw the American Express charge-card deal as an important demonstration of its
structuring abilities and as a means by which it could further establish itself as an innovative and
leading underwriter of asset-backed securities”.11Thus, the possibility of underwriting a large share
of charge-card receivables motivated Lehman Brothers to come up with a new security, diﬀerent
to the existing credit-card-backed or ﬁxed-asset-backed securities. It consisted on issuing debt
collateralized by a portfolio of charge-card receivables. Interest payments to the holders of the
security were ﬁnanced by an additional discount on the purchase of the receivables, which was
declared as the yield and used to provide a liquidity cushion against the risk of default. Note that
asset-backed securities traded before the charge-card-backed products used ﬁnancing charges to pay
interest, but charge-cards do not collect ﬁnance charges.
In the ﬁrst deal, 6’995,152 accounts were selected at random from American Express’s portfolio
and bundled in a master trust. These accounts amounted to $2.4 billion, while the total value
of outstanding charge card receivables was $6.9 billion. Later, the underwriter and the issuer
had the faculty to add or remove accounts from the trust. As documented by Mason et. al. [15,
1995], the securitization process allowed them to isolate accounts and have information on the trust
performance on a monthly basis. For the sale prospectus though, it was not required to disclose
individual account information, just aggregate statistics.
71.2 Nikkei 225 Put Warrants
The Nikkei 225 Put Warrant was a complicated transaction by which investment banks underwrote
the issue of a put option on the performance of the Nikkei 225 index. Issuers were generally
sovereign ﬁrms and the security was traded in the United States (American Stock Exchange).
Goldman, Sachs, Inc. was the ﬁrst investment banker to underwrite such issues. The ﬁrst deal was
completed in January of 1990.
This innovation was attractive to American investors because they were able to hold a security
that would allow them to bet against the Nikkei 225 Index by buying the put option (expectations
then were that the Nikkei 225 would soon revert its upward trend, and it did). Sovereign issuers
could use this security as a cheaper source of ﬁnance, given the expectations in the US market
about the Nikkei 225. Since the probability that the holders would exercise their option was high,
Goldman, Sachs swapped with the issuers the risk of conversion and hedged this risk itself in its
investment portfolio.
Since then, Goldman pioneered this type of deal in the 1990s and was, for a decade, the only
investment bank to underwrite such a deal for issuers that were not the bank itself (the investment
banking departments of Salomon Inc., Bankers Trust and Paine Webber underwrote these products
but the issuers were their own investment divisions). In fact, Goldman started engineering put
warrants type of deals but using diﬀerent indexes, like France’s CAC-40.
It is also worth noting that Goldman’s hedging positions for each one of these deals were not
disclosed (see Ryan and Granovsky [24, 2000])
1.3 Other Cases
Some anecdotal evidence also exhibits similar features as the ones described in the cases above.
Thackray [27, 1985], for example, documents how Drexel, Burnham, Lambert did not disclose
8its “junk-bond” prospectuses to Wall Street insiders because of fears that competitor’s imitations
may challenge their lead in the market for underwriting high-yield debt. J.P. Morgan’s lead in
underwriting asset-backed securities using its so called BISTRO variety of a collateralized loan
obligation arguably hinges on the discretion with which it manages the pool of assets used as
collateral (Roper [23, 1999]). Salomon dominated the market of ELKS (equity-linked securities),
its own creation, and also managed the pool of backing assets at its discretion.
2 The Structure of the Model
In the subsections that follow we introduce the information structure and the innovation game
which is general to the class of ﬁnancial innovations discussed throughout the paper. There are
two classes of agents in this model: investment banks and issuers. The investment banks are the
innovator or the imitators of a given new security or private ﬁnancial contract. The issuers are
ﬁrms or institutional investors that hold an asset whose cashﬂow is swapped or used to back the
issue of the new security.
2.1 The Innovation Game
We model ﬁnancial innovation as a three stage game where the players are a ﬁnite number of
investment bankers, indexed by i =1 ,2,...,I. Each stage is a time period t =0 ,1 and 2.
At t =0one of the banks has to decide whether or not to invest in developing an innovation. It
has to pay an R&D cost of C to develop a new type of private ﬁnancial contract (e.g., a credit
derivative or an asset-backed security). The probability that this innovation is successful, i.e.,
that it will attract issuers and induce them to sign deals with the banker is θ ∈ (0,1).W e
assume that the probability that two bankers develop the same instrument simultaneously is
zero.
9At t =1only the banker that paid C, i.e., the innovator, makes underwriting deals with issuers
using the innovative product. By the end of this period, however, the new design has been
revealed to the investment banks that did not innovate, i.e., the imitators. Note that they
have not paid the R&D cost.
At t =2the innovator and the imitators compete to make deals with the issuers. All investment
banks now engage in Bertrand Competition in underwriting fees.
See Figure 1 for an illustration of the timing described above.
2.1.1 The Issuers and their Types
While the only heterogeneity among the I investment banks is that one is and innovator and (I−1)
are imitators, the issuers can be of many diﬀerent types. The issuers are the potential clients of
banks and they can be of a type f ∈ {1,2,...,F}. There are a continuum of issuers for each type.
The notion of an issuer type in this context, can be understood more intuitively by relating it to
the case studies mentioned above. When Lehman Brothers updated the selection of accounts in
t h ep o o lo fA m e r i c a nE x p r e s sc h a r g e - c a r dc o l l ectibles they used information of the credit proﬁles of
the holders. Similarly, Salomon Brothers had to form a pool of stocks to back the repayment of the
issue of equity-linked securities dubbed ELKS. The types of stocks selected would be the types we
refer to here, and would be those that are particularly related to the dividend stream stipulated by
the security issued. In the case of mortgage-backed securities, the types can correspond also to the
risk proﬁles of the borrowers, which is eﬀectively approximated by the geographical distribution of
the loans.12
We deﬁne a state of the world z ∈ {1,2,...,Z}, which represents one of the possible contingencies
of the cash ﬂow of the assets that diﬀerent issuers or institutional investors have full claim to. For
each issuer type there are many identical issuers and the cash ﬂow of anyone of type f depends on
10the state of the world. We assume that each issuer holds one unit of cash ﬂow that pays Xf.L e t
Hf(X|z) be the distribution of Xf conditional on the realized state of the world. As we will see
below, from the knowledge of this distribution and the observations of X something can be learned
about the true realization of z. The true state is a random draw from of a prior distribution G(z)
over {1,2,...,Z}. This distribution is common knowledge to all investment banks. The actual
realization of z is unknown before the end of the game.
2.1.2 The Contract
Here we model a private contract between a potential issuer with claims to Xf and an investment
bank. In this contract the issuer agrees to sell the payment stream it owns to the investment bank
in exchange for another cash ﬂow with diﬀerent characteristics. In general, these two cash ﬂows
may have diﬀerent credit risk, diﬀerent types of indexation (currencies, commodity prices, interest
rates), and diﬀerent degrees of association with other random variables.
Formally, the type f will exchange its cash ﬂow, Xf, for a payoﬀ stream, Y, which has a diﬀerent
dependence on z.13For the exchange, the banker charges a transaction fee, s.14
It is important to stress the fact that the market for these private contracts diﬀers from a
generic product market in which there are many potential buyers of a product and where every
seller cannot monitor each transaction made by their competitors. The market for private ﬁnancial
contracts described here is a market where the issuers (the bank’s counterparts) are institutional
investors or big corporations, so each transaction can be monitored. In eﬀect, however, many
details of such contracts are generally kept private for some time, and the very fact that they can
be monitored makes it easier to detect any infringement of the conﬁdentiality agreements on the
part of the clients. Thus, the adverse eﬀect on the reputation of the clients constitutes a strong
incentive to honor the conﬁdentiality agreement.
112.1.3 The Innovation
Investment banks pool diﬀerent types of payment streams and form a portfolio which is suited to
the objectives of the bank. For example, the pool may be used as collateral for the newly issued
security (which is sold to outside investors), or it may be used to hedge the current positions that
the bank itself has. In the case of mortgage-backed securities, the pool of outstanding mortgages
was used to back the payment of interest of the diﬀerent tranches of securities issued. In the case
of the Nikkei 225 Put Warrants, the bankers insured the issuer of the put on the Nikkei index
by swapping away from them the risk of investors exercising the put option and hedging the risk
themselves in their own investment portfolio. A wide array of credit derivatives also falls in this
category. Some examples are Interest Rate Swaps, Collateralized Debt Obligations, and other
highly structured debt instruments in which investment banks swap with the issuers the default
r i s ko fap o o lo fa s s e t s .
The innovation here is essentially the development of the payment function Y that issuers
would trade for their own income stream. However, an important part of doing deals using this
new contract is making them with the right types of issuers, i.e., getting right the types of cash
ﬂows more suitable for the pool. More speciﬁcally, the innovation will be fully determined by Y
and the tuple α ∈ RF with
P
f αf =1of the proportions of each type of investment cash ﬂows that
form the bundle. We will call this vector α the bundle speciﬁcation. In other words, the innovation
consists of a new way to swap the cash ﬂow of issuers, and a clever way of bundling them together.
2.1.4 Payoﬀsf r o mt h eD e a l
Issuers If a banker i purchases the cash ﬂow Xf it gives in exchange Y . In addition, it charges
af e esi. The payoﬀ for a type f is then Y −si −Xf.T h ei s s u e ri so ﬀered this contract by all rival
12banks and chooses to make the deal that maximizes its payoﬀ. In other words, each issuer solves
choose i ∈ {1,...,I} to maximize Y − si − Xf (P1)
Note that here we take as given the fact that the deal is attractive to the issuer because the
new income stream Y is more convenient than their current stream Xf : it may have a lower
credit risk or be negatively correlated with some other income streams they have. A more general
way to deal with this issue would be to verify that the equilibrium fees satisfy the condition
Ezu(Y −si) ≥ Ezu(Xf). This is, though, not the essential discussion we pursue, so we will assume
that it is a veriﬁed condition.
Investment Banks The revenue for an investment bank for one deal with a type f is:
Xf + si − Y.
We assume that banks are capacity-constrained and can make a (normalized) total number of deals




αf(Xf + si − Y )=ϕ(z)+si − Y, (1)




αfXf(z) ∀z ∈ {1,2,...,Z}.
13Investment banks choose a bundle speciﬁcation α and a fee s to maximize (1) and taking as given
the maximizing behavior of the issuers that they deal with. Since the fee s does not aﬀect the value
of the bankers portfolio, ϕ(z), we can break down the optimization problem in two parts. First,
banks solve the following problem:





and Va r[ϕ(z)] ≤ V.
Investment banks are maximizing the expected value of their portfolio subject to the constraint
that they cannot aﬀord a limited volatility of returns in their portfolio.15We assume that V is small
enough so that the constraint is binding. This will imply that the problem has an interior solution:
α∗ ∈ (0,1)F. We will solve this maximization problem after we describe the learning process.
2.2 Interpretation of the Game
At the start, an investment bank has to decide whether to develop or not a ﬁnancial product. This
product has a development cost C, and it is designed to attract issuers that hold claims to certain
types of random cash ﬂows. Once developed, the innovator makes the ﬁrst underwriting deals,
being the only underwriter of the issues using such a contract. Immediately after the ﬁrst contracts
are signed, some information about them always ﬁlters out to other investment banks that become
able to imitate the product.16The market for this type of underwriting becomes competitive then.
By the time imitation comes in, though, the innovator has already concluded some deals and has
been able to gain some expertise. This will allow him to perfect the deal and, in particular, to
improve the underlying money making scheme. This idea is summarized by the following testimony:
14“In Credit Derivatives, imitators can fully understand our new product but they don’t know how
to make money with it,” (Andrei Paracivescu, Credit Derivatives Trader, J.P. Morgan.)[20, 2001]
The result of learning-by-doing is an information advantage of the developer over the imitators.
In our framework, the innovator will have learned to match more appropriately the diﬀerent types of
institutions’ payment streams creating a better portfolio of deals, i.e., enhancing his money-making
scheme. Since the innovator’s benchmark contract or terms-sheet is revealed (in this model what
is revealed is Y, or what to swap for X), the imitators can make their own deals, oﬀering the same
contract but they will not have the same skill and expertise as innovators in creating the portfolio
of deals. Again, as a Wall Street practitioner puts it, “everybody can see the laid-out contract
but what I am careful not to disclose are the positions in my book. With this information you
could track down the logic and see where I make money,” (Andrei Paracivescu, Credit Derivatives
Trader, J.P. Morgan.)[20, 2001]
This setup covers cases in which the new product or contract is standardized to all the clients.
The fees of the contract are homogeneous across types and so are the terms of the exchange: Xf
for Y. Thus, we can also think of contracts where the terms of the deal are contingent on the type
of issuer that trades with the banker (e.g., diﬀerentiated fees or conversion ratios). Such behavior
may have many interesting eﬀects. On one hand, the innovator may discriminate clients by oﬀering
diﬀerent contracts to each type to increase his proﬁts but, on the other hand, these deals contingent
on the issuer may also imply a faster disclosure of information. With standardized deals, imitators
can learn only from their own deals or from the innovator’s full record of deals (if this information
were available). With diﬀerentiated deals, imitators may only need information about one or a few
deals per type, e.g., how is a type f contract diﬀerent from a type g contract. Incorporating this
trade-oﬀ into the security design problem could be an important focus of future research. In this
paper, however, we keep the contract standard, in part to be consistent with the motivating case
15studies and also to keep the focus on the process of extraction of information from making deals.
3 The Innovator’s Learning Process
In this section we explain the mechanism through which this learning-by-doing occurs, and illustrate
what is the private signal that allows the innovator to have asymmetric information which is
advantageous over its imitators.
3.1 The General Set-up
To ﬁxi d e a s ,l e tF = Z so that there are as many types of issuers as states of the world. Issuers of
any type can have either a high cash ﬂow, H, or a low one, L (H>L ). “Good” states for diﬀerent
types will be those states where the probability of having a high cash ﬂow is greater than having
a low one; “bad” states will be those in which the latter is not true. We assume that for each type
there is only one good state and that this state is only good for that type of ﬁrm. Without loss of
generality, let the good state for any arbitrary type f be such that z = f. Thus, we can summarize
Hf(X|z) by:
Pr(Xf = H|z = f)=1− ε, (2)
Pr(Xf = H|z 6= f)=γ,∀f,z.
where ε and γ are small enough (all we need is for them to be smaller than 1
2). Figure 2 illustrates
these conditional distributions, for the case of Type 1 issuers.
Consider the case of an investment bank that has no information about the true state of the
world. The bank knows the prior probability distribution G(z) over the states that, to keep things
simple, we assume to be the uniform. An innovator holds claims to a pool of assets of diﬀerent
16types and he observes the realization of each type’s payoﬀs. Thus, eﬀectively he gets a private
signal in the ﬁrst stage. This signal, e X, gives him a more accurate knowledge of the realized state
o ft h ew o r l d . I ti sa nF-dimensional vector of the cash ﬂows of assets of each type. Formally,
e X ∈ {H,L}F. Conditional on this signal, and the distributions given by (2), the innovator updates
his prior beliefs about the actual realization of the state of the world. Notice that the signal can
be mapped in two subsets of types: one containing those types that had high cash ﬂows (the “high
types”) and the other containing those that did not (the “low types”).
3.2 Bayesian Updating
For a uniform prior we have that ∀z,G(z)= 1
Z. The generic signal will be a sequence of H and L.
Now, we can deﬁne the sets
H = {f|Xf = H} and L = {f|Xf = L},
and let #(H)=h and #(L)=l,s ot h a th + l = Z.
Then for any state f ∈ H , the posterior probability that this state was realized would be given
by:
Pr(z = f|e X,f ∈ H)=
=































> 1 for ε and γ small enough. For states f ∈ L,


























Z + h[λ − 1]
.
Then, for most signals, i.e., for h =1 ,2,...,Z− 1, t h e r ew i l lb eu p d a t i n g ,i . e . :
Pr(z = f|e X,f ∈ H) >
1
Z
> Pr(z = f|e X,f ∈ L).
Notice that the diﬀerence between the probabilities above is λ−1
Z+h[λ−1], which is decreasing in the
observed number h of high types. Intuitively, the set of states of the world is partitioned in one
with those more likely states and another with the less likely. The smaller h, the smaller the set of
more likely states and the larger its complement. Thus, each state within the smaller set has more
probability of being the realized one.
Note that the signals (H,H,...,H) and (L,L,...,L) don’t allow any updating of the prior dis-
tribution G(z). The probability that the innovator gets a signal which allows updating, and in
consequence, the probability of having superior information for the next issues of the new instru-
ment is:
ξ =1− (1 − ε)γZ−1 − ε(1 − γ)Z−1. (3)
3.3 Portfolio Choice for Innovators at t =2
Given that investment banks solve the problem (P2), this implies that:
18Lemma 1 The Lagrangian for (P2), Λ, is symmetric with respect all αf such that f ∈ H and all
αg such that g ∈ L:
Λ(...,αi,...,αj,...)=Λ(...,αj,...,αi,...) ∀i,j ∈ H,
Λ(...,αg,...,αh,...)=Λ(...,αh,...,αg,...) ∀g,h ∈ L.
Proof. See appendix.
This will imply that the solution arising from the ﬁrst-order condition is also symmetric across
types with the same realized cash ﬂow in t =1 :
αi = αH ∀i ∈ H,( 4 )
αi = αL ∀i ∈ L.
With updated beliefs on the states of the world, an informed banker will now form bundles that
put more weight on the high types. That is, αH > αL.
3.4 Portfolio Choice of Uninformed Bankers
Imitators, or innovators at t =1 , know only a prior distribution of the true state of the world.
That is, they have not had the chance to observe a signal e X and update their beliefs. Given this
information, and given the symmetry of (P2), an uninformed banker can only form bundles with
all the types of ﬁrms weighted symmetrically. That is, αf = 1
F for any type f.
The conﬁdentiality agreements guarantee that imitating banks are prevented from gathering
crucial information, such as the bundle speciﬁcation, from the innovator’s clients. In reality, it
is observed that bankers make sure that their bundle speciﬁcation is not disclosed early enough.
For example, in the American Express Charge-Card securitization case, only the aggregate value
19of the accounts pooled was publicly reported, and not the active management of the portfolio.
Similarly, as we mentioned before, Drexel, Brunham, Lambert were careful to keep private the
order-ﬂow of their “junk-bond” deals. In more recent cases, it has been well documented that due
to discretionary management of the pools backing collateralized loan obligations it is impossible to
observe the positions and to be rated by Standard & Poor (See Roper [23, 1999]).
Perhaps this fact is best summarized by a recent statement in the Recommendations for Disclo-
sure of Trading and Derivatives Activities of Banks and Securities Firms, by the Basle Committee
on Banking Supervision, on February 1999: “institutions should disclose information produced by
their internal risk measurement and management systems on their risk exposures and their actual
performance in managing these exposures. Linking public disclosure to internal risk management
processes helps ensure that disclosure keeps pace with innovations in risk measurement and man-
agement techniques.”[2, 1999].
3.5 A Simple Case of Learning: Two types, Two states
The discussion above argues that ﬁrst-movers are able to assign higher probability of occurrence
to those states that are good for the institutions that had high cash ﬂows at the ﬁrst stage of the
game (and lower probability to the other states). Next, we develop the model for a simpler case
where ﬁrms can be of one of two types only.
In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrst-mover develops the bundle with equal weights for each type, i.e.,
α1 = α2 = 1
2. Imitators in the second stage have the same information as innovators had in the
previous period. Thus, they can only form the (1
2, 1
2) bundle.
Signals are drawn out of the set {(H,H),(H,L),(L,H),(L,L)} conditional on the realized
state of the world. Notice that, in this symmetric case, the signals (H,H),(L,L) do not allow any
updating. From (3), this probability equals ε + γ − 2εγ.
20If the ﬁrst mover observes any of the two signals that allow him to update his prior beliefs G(z)
then he will form a bundle in the second stage with larger weight on high types. Let this weight
be αH. Then, it is clear that αH > 1
2 > αL =1− αH.
An event in this world is characterized by the triple (z,X1,X 2). Four of the eight possible events
involve non-informative signals and in two of them the realized state is not the most likely one,
given the signal. In the latter cases, the future cash ﬂows of the ﬁrm with more weight in the
bundle would be low with a large probability.
Based on this information structure we compute the expected payoﬀs of imitators’ and innova-
tors’ portfolios using the Lemma below.
Lemma 2 In the case where Innovators can update their beliefs on the realization of the state of
the world, i.e., when the signal is informative, we have:
E(ϕIn)={αH (1 − γ)(1 − ε)
(1 − γ)(1 − ε)+γε
+ αL γε
(1 − γ)(1 − ε)+γε
}[(1 − ε)H + εL]+
{αH γε
(1 − γ)(1 − ε)+γε
+ αL (1 − γ)(1 − ε)
(1 − γ)(1 − ε)+γε




[(1 − ε)H + εL]+
1
2
[γH +( 1− γ)L]. (6)
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 3 In the case where Innovators receive uninformative signals, the portfolio of innovators




[(1 − ε)H + εL]+
1
2
[γH +( 1− γ)L]. (7)
Proof. See appendix.
21Our goal now is to show that, when learning occurs, the innovator will have a better portfolio
of deals than the imitator. The reason for this is straight forward: the innovator’s bundle has more
units of cash ﬂows of institutions of the high types and these are ex-ante more likely to have high
returns in t =2 .
Proposition 4 Whenever Innovators get an informative signal, E(ϕIn) >E (ϕIm).
Proof. See appendix.
Note that even though in some nodes of the last stage innovators will be no diﬀerent than
imitators, the probability of reaching these nodes is small. The event that there is no learning from
the innovator becomes less likely as the number of types increases: the number of uninformative
signals is always only two, while the total number of possible signals is 2F. This is seen formally
in equation (3), as
∂ξ
∂F > 0. This is intuitive: the more deals across diﬀerent types an innovator
m a k e s ,t h em o r el i k e l yi ti sh ew i l ll e a r nt oi m p r o v eh i sp o r t f o l i oa n dt h eh i g h e rt h ep r o ﬁtm a r g i n
he will have with respect to imitators, as we will see below.
3.6 Issuers’s Choice
All issuers that sign this underwriting contract are willing to swap X for the new payment stream
Y. Since all investment bankers oﬀe rt h es a m ec a s hﬂow in exchange, Y, it is clear from (P1) that
the issuers will be attracted to the banker that charges the lowest underwriting fee, s. That is, they
choose i ∈ {1,2,...,I} to minimize si.
224 The Equilibrium
4.1 Bertrand Competition
We assume that investment banks will compete à la Bertrand in fees by undercutting each other.
The undercutting process will reach a halt when imitators make zero proﬁts. As a result, the
equilibrium fee will be given by the imitators’ zero proﬁt condition:
s∗ = Y − E(ϕIm). (8)
This will be the equilibrium underwriting fee charged to issuers. Indeed, for that fee, the innovator
makes the proﬁt:
E(ϕIn) − Y + s∗ = E(ϕIn) − E(ϕIm). (9)
If the proﬁts in (9) are positive, the pioneer will be able to marginally lower his fee further to
attract more institutions, as we will show later.
Proposition 5 At t =2 , imitators make zero proﬁt in equilibrium and the innovator makes proﬁt
E(ϕIn) − E(ϕIm).
Note that the higher the wedge between the expected returns of the portfolio of innovator over
the imitators’, the larger the developer’s proﬁts. The innovator’s proﬁts are determined by the
extent of the learning-by-doing in the ﬁrst stage, that is, by how much he learned how to improve
the money-making scheme in the second round of underwriting with respect to the ﬁrst. Of course,
in the unlikely event that there is no learning (no improving of the portfolio of deals), competition
by imitators will drive innovator’s second stage proﬁts to zero.
234.2 Market Shares
If there is learning the developer’s proﬁt will be positive and it will allow him to undercut the fee
s∗ further by, say, an epsilon, and swap as many units of Y for X until his capacity constraint is
reached. This will leave imitators to share the rest of the underwriting market. If we assume that
issuers represent the short side of this market, the underwriting contracts will be rationed across
imitators. Even though all investment banks have the same capacity, the equilibrium market shares
of innovator and imitators are not the same. Since the innovator has the information advantage,
he chooses a lower fee that allows him to underwrite deals at full capacity.
As in standard Bertrand competition, in this model each imitator’s share of the new product’s
market is really undetermined because they make zero proﬁts. Since the imitators are identical we
can assume that the contracts that remain to be underwritten after the innovator has taken his
share are equally rationed among them, following the general convention for Bertrand allocations.
This will leave the innovator being the market leader, i.e., having the biggest market share.
Notice that it is not important that the innovator has a larger market share. Just because he is
better informed about the state of the world, he is the only bank that can work at full capacity for
any size of the market of potential issuers, and he is the only banker making proﬁts with free-entry.
Here we illustrate that this model can have as a prediction the market-shares leadership fact by
assuming that imitators ration the proportion not underwritten by the innovator.
4.3 Optimality of Innovating
The ﬁnal step is to ﬁnd the optimal choice of the potential innovator and the equilibrium allocations
resulting from this choice. At t =0this bank must decide whether or not to pay the development
cost C. The potential developer will have to take into account that the innovation is risky: if he
develops and pays C, there is a probability θ that the new product attracts institutions, but with
24probability 1 − θ the innovation will not be marketable, and the developer will make a loss.
If the innovative product proves to be successful, the developer will have to face competition from
imitators. Imitators will enter the market after they see the ﬁrst innovative deals. The developer’s
proﬁts from these ﬁrst deals, i.e., in the learning stage, are zero. This is because in this stage
the newly established innovator has the same information and expertise as an imitator in the
next stage. So, since the time lapse between the introduction of a new ﬁnancial product and the
appearance of imitations is typically very short, an innovator in the ﬁrst stage eﬀectively competes
in fees with the imitators. With no time discounting, if an innovator charges a higher underwriting
fee institutions will prefer to wait for the next period and make a more convenient deal with
an imitator.17As a consequence, for the investment in the development of a new product to be
worthwhile, the developer will have to make positive proﬁts in the last stage, when competition
from imitators drives proﬁt margins down.18The developer will have on his side additional expertise
and information over is competitors. In our model, this will happen if and only if some learning
occurs in the ﬁrst stage, that is, with probability ξ. With probability 1−ξ, the innovator will have
no comparative advantage with respect to his imitators and will make zero proﬁt.
To summarize, at t =0 , the expected proﬁts for a bank that decides to invest to develop the
innovation are:
θ[ξ(E(ϕIn) − E(ϕIm)) + (1 − ξ)(0)] + (1 − θ)(0) − C.
That is, at the start of the game, a potential developer will pay the development cost C if and only
if:
θξ[E(ϕIn) − E(ϕIm)] ≥ C. (10)
25Note that ξ increases in F. That is, the more deals a pioneer is able to make prior to imitation, the
higher the likelihood that he will gain expertise over his competitors from his ﬁrst issues and that
he will perfect the way to make money using this new way ﬁnancial product. This constitutes his
ﬁrst-mover advantage.
Despite the absence of patents and the possibility of cost-less and early imitation, investment in
R&D is still proﬁtable for the investment banks. The monopolistic advantage derived from the ﬁrst
stage learning guarantees positive proﬁts for innovators in the second period. Imitation may look
attractive because it is cost-less but, for this same reason, has the disadvantage of being undertaken
by almost all other banks: competition is ﬁerce and generates low (zero in our model) proﬁts.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The empirical evidence (such as Tufano [30, 1989]) shows that ﬁnancial innovation is a permanent
phenomenon even in the absence of patents and that innovators dominate the markets where their
innovations are used or traded. In this paper we argue that an innovator of ﬁnancial products (such
as asset-backed securities, swaps or credit derivatives) may not need to foreclose imitation by legal
means, i.e., with patents, to derive proﬁts from the innovation. Recent case studies revised here or
described elsewhere show that, for many types of new ﬁnancial products, there is a substantial value
in the information the innovator acquires through the deals it makes. To help explain these studies,
we model an innovator as a ﬁrst-mover in a game where every deal made for a given innovation
improves the knowledge about the characteristics of the client. This learning feature may explain
why for instance imitators never caught up with Goldman Sachs in the market for underwriting
issues of Nikkei Put Warrants or why JP Morgan dominated the underwriting of collateralized
loans. In both cases the innovator had acquired superior expertise on the conﬁguration of a pool
of assets underlying the payoﬀ promised by the issued securities.
26The present work also contributes to the ongoing discussion triggered by the State Street Case
resolution, in which the US Supreme Court decided to uphold a patent for a ﬁnancial business
method in 1999. The immediate eﬀect of this decision should be to encourage ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial
industry to acquire new patents or enforce old ones. It is not clear, though, what other incentives
this decision may introduce. We argue here that patents are not necessary for some innovations
to occur. What makes these innovations proﬁtable is that the innovator exploits an information
advantage during the competitive/imitation stage. Thus, the supra-normal proﬁts that can recoup
the initial R&D expenditure are realized during this imitation stage, not during the period of
temporary monopoly in which the innovator moves alone while imitators unravel the design of the
new product. Therefore, for many innovations, a patent would just distort the allocation of the
surplus created, most likely in favor of the innovative banker. Moreover, in a dynamic context
a patent may reduce the incentives to develop future innovations. Van Horne [32, 1985] pointed
o u tt h a tt h el i f ec y c l eo fﬁnancial innovation usually involves the gradual erosion of the innovator’s
proﬁts and that the beneﬁts to innovation are increasingly realized by the end users of the products.
In the search for new proﬁt opportunities in the absence of patents, incentives for the creation or
perfection of ﬁnancial products arise. In this sense, an interesting avenue of research is to study
the market shares and proﬁts of innovators and imitators à la Tufano but across time, that is,
focusing on the time evolution of an innovation and its subsequent generations. One step in this
direction was taken by Schroth [25, 2002] who observes that equity-linked innovations are followed
by improved versions, or “next generation” innovations.
The State Street Case will provide a natural experiment to address these issues rigorously. An
assessment of its overall impact on the quantity, variety and proﬁtability of ﬁnancial innovations
as well as on the welfare issues such as the surplus sharing among innovators imitators and ﬁnal
buyers remains to be documented.
27Figure 1
In this ﬁgure we illustrate the timing of the innovation game. There are three periods. In
period 0 a given investment bank chooses to become an innovator or not. If it wants to innovate
it must pay an R&D cost, C. In period 1, it is only the innovator that makes underwriting deals
using the new ﬁnancial product. Given his information about the quality of the potential clients,
it chooses the composition of the pool of clients to deal with, α, and the underwriting fees. At the
end of this period, he extracts a private signal. Imitators do not make any underwriting deals, but
they discover the design of the product, as they observe what the innovator swaps with ﬁrms: a
cashﬂow Y for the cashﬂow held by ﬁrms, X. In period 2, the innovator and its imitators compete
for market share using the same ﬁnancial product, and choosing the pool speciﬁcation and the fees.
Figure 2
This diagram illustrates the probability distribution function of the cash ﬂow that an issuer of
type 1 has claims to. z is the underlying random variable that introduces uncertainty in the cash
ﬂow, and there are Z possible states of nature. Only one state is the “good state” for each type
and the rest of states are bad states for it. In this diagram, state z =1is the good state for the
issuer of type 1. Note that H>L ,while ε and γ are smaller than 1
2.
28Appendix
Proof to Lemma 1. We omit a proof, since we believe it is veriﬁed only by inspection.
Proof to Lemmas 2 and 3. In any state, one of the two ﬁrms in the bundle will have high
cash ﬂows with a probability 1 − ε and the other with probability γ. When innovators receive an
informative signal and form up the bundle with larger weight for the good type, the true state could
be indeed the one suggested by the high signal, in which case the expected payoﬀs of the bundle
would be
αH[(1 − ε)H + εL]+αL[γH +( 1− γ)L]. (11)
In case the true state is not the most likely one, given the signal, the expected payoﬀ of the same
bundle would be
αL[(1 − ε)H + εL]+αH[γH +( 1− γ)L]. (12)
Now then, the probability of receiving a “correct ” informative signal, i.e., the one where the
good type has a payoﬀ of H,i s
(1−ε)(1−γ)
(1−ε)(1−γ)+εγ while the probability of getting incorrect signals is
εγ
(1−ε)(1−γ)+εγ .
The expected payoﬀ to the innovators’ bundle at any node of the game where the signal was
29informative is then nothing but the weighted average of equations (11) and (12):
E(ϕIn)=
(1 − ε)(1 − γ)
(1 − ε)(1 − γ)+εγ
{αH[(1 − ε)H + εL]+αL[γH +( 1− γ)L]+
εγ
(1 − ε)(1 − γ)+εγ
{αL[(1 − ε)H + εL]+αH[γH +( 1− γ)L]}
= {αH (1 − ε)(1 − γ)
(1 − ε)(1 − γ)+εγ
+ αL εγ
(1 − ε)(1 − γ)+εγ
}[(1 − ε)H + εL]+
{αL (1 − ε)(1 − γ)
(1 − ε)(1 − γ)+εγ
+ αH εγ
(1 − ε)(1 − γ)+εγ
}[γH +( 1− γ)L].
For any uninformative signal, innovators choose equal weights for each type of institution. Thus,




[(1 − ε)H + εL]+
1
2
[γH +( 1− γ)L]. (13)
Imitators behave just like innovators who have received signals that allow no updating. They





= E[ϕ|z =1 ]Pr[z =1 ]+E[ϕ|z =2 ]Pr[z =2 ] (14)
E[ϕ|z =1 ] = E[ϕ|z =2 ]=
1
2
[(1 − ε)H + εL]+
1
2









[(1 − ε)H + εL]+
1
2
[γH +( 1− γ)L].
It is important to notice that this last result does not depend on the probability distribution.
30Imitators believe that Pr[z =1 ]= Pr[z =2 ]=1
2, the common prior. Once Innovators have updated
their beliefs they will in general ﬁnd new diﬀerent values for this probabilities. Therefore, it could
be argued that imitators are “wrong”, i.e., less accurate than the one made by innovators that have
learned more about the state of the world. However, given the symmetry of this setup this is not
an issue here: E
£
ϕIm¤
does not depend on the probability distribution. Probabilities add up to one
and cancel out, since they multiply a common symmetric factor.
By assumption, H>L , 0 < ε,γ < 1
2 and αH > 1
2. Now,
E(ϕIn − ϕIm)={αH (1 − ε)(1 − γ)
(1 − ε)(1 − γ)+εγ
+ αL εγ




}[(1 − ε)H + εL]+
{αL εγ
(1 − ε)(1 − γ)+εγ
+ αH (1 − ε)(1 − γ)




}[γH +( 1− γ)L].
Substituting for αL =1− αH,
E(ϕIn − ϕIm)=( αH −
1
2








)(1 − γ − ε)(H − L),
which is clearly positive by the assumptions above.
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35Footnotes
1. Only recently, in January of 1999, a patent for a “ﬁnancial method or formula” was upheld by
the United States Supreme Court. The State Street Bank of Boston ﬁled a lawsuit against a
patent for a valuation algorithm by the Signature Financial Group of Massachussetts, arguing
that the business method exemption provision in the patent law made this particular patent
unlawful. The Supreme Court upheld the patent however, setting an important precedent
that may make most innovations in ﬁnance patentable. As Lerner [14, 2000] argues, the
number of patent ﬁllings and awards may increase sharply now that the State Street Case has
been settled.
2. See Tirole [28, 1988, Ch. 10] for a description of the reasons why imitation of discoveries
provides incentives for maintaining low levels of R&D.
3. Benoît [3, 1985] and Reinganum [22, 1983] provide some notable examples.
4. For all the 58 innovations he studied, the median number of underwriting deals completed by
the innovating bank prior to entry by rival banks was of only one.
5. The relevant innovation cost is not only R&D, but all the sunk payments required to discover
and introduce an innovation. Mansﬁeld [16, 1971] disaggregates them in R&D, the building
of production facilities, and marketing. In the IO literature, these costs are usually referred
to as R&D. In this paper we follow the IO convention and use the term R&D to refer to total
innovation costs.
6. Investment bankers interviewed by Tufano [30, 1989] reportedly spent between $50,000 and
$5 million to develop each new security. In a study by Naslund [18, 1986], marketing costs
for innovations by 20 ﬁnancial institutions range between $1 million and $3 million.
367. Krigman, Shaw and Womack [13, 2000] mention other reasons why ﬁrms switch underwriters,
the most important being the tendency to gradually select more reputed bankers to beneﬁt
from the higher quality of their research analysts.
8. Miller [17, 1986], for example, argues that what spurred the latest innovation “wave” were
loopholes in tax codes that provided incentives to design securities that circumvented reg-
ulation. Finnerty [10, 1992] describes diﬀerent ways in which new securities add value and
relates them to corporate ﬁnancial innovations since the 70s. A broader survey of the history
ﬁnancial innovation is provided by Tufano [31, 1995].
9. In a general setting, Boldrin and Levine [6, 2002] show how the natural monopoly position
of the innovator as a provider of the original prototype can make the innovative process
worthwhile despite imitation. In the case of ﬁnancial innovation, Black and Silber [5, 1986]
present a model in which the innovator is a futures exchange that develops and advantage
for creating a new contract by providing liquidity for investors earlier than the competing
exchanges in order to attract future trades.
10. Another contribution of learning to corporate ﬁnance is the one by Douglas Diamond [8,
1991].
11. By that time, a large share of Credit-Card receivables had already been securitized by Citibank
and First Boston and where publicly traded.
12. Coincidentally, Fannie Mae, the largest issuer of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized
mortgage obligations started reporting publicly the disaggregation of the pool of securitized
mortgages in its 2001 Information Statement. The ﬁrst mortgage-backed securities were
introduced in the early 1980s.
3713. In general, Y can be made contingent on many observable random variables. Credit deriva-
tives will often provide insurance to ﬁnancial institutions by swapping their uncertain cash
ﬂow for one which is tied to a more popular and less volatile index, e.g., tied to LIBOR. Y
can also be a payment in cash if the banker is just buying outstanding loans to pool them.
14. This fee would be equivalent to the underwriting spread.
15. This volatility restrictions are common practice in portfolio management. Besides, this con-
straint also allows to solve the indeterminacy on the weights α of all the H types and all the
L types. Alternatively, a problem in which bankers have mean-variance utility would produce
the same result.
16. Although these kinds of private contracts are strictly conﬁdential, information is leaked in
various ways: the client may go to other investment banks to seek a better fee, or people that
develop these products may be hired away to competing banks.
17. Indeed, when oﬀered an innovative deal by its developer at a given price, institutions often
search around to see if other bankers can oﬀer them a cheaper deal. As we mentioned, this
is one channel through which some strictly conﬁdential information about the innovation is
transmitted to potential imitators. In reality, as we mentioned, what is rather disclosed is
the new swap technology, Y.
18. This result is consistent with the evidence that Tufano [30, 1989] found: when they are the sole
underwriters, innovators do not charge fees larger than when they compete with imitators.
38Innovator: Choose α, s Observe signal Choose α, s
Yes
Imitators: No move Observe Y Choose α, s
No Game Over
Innovator: Pay C?
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Figure 1: An illustration of the timing of the innovation game.
















Figure 2: An illustration of the probability distribution function of the cash ﬂow of a type 1 issuer.
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